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ON THE INEVITABILITY OF THE CONSISTENCY OPERATOR
ANTONIO MONTALBÁN AND JAMES WALSH
Abstract. We examine recursive monotonic functions on the Lindenbaum
algebra of EA. We prove that no such function sends every consistent ϕ to
a sentence with deductive strength strictly between ϕ and pϕ ^ Conpϕqq. We
generalize this result to iterates of consistency into the effective transfinite. We
then prove that for any recursive monotonic function f , if there is an iterate of
Con that bounds f everywhere, then f must be somewhere equal to an iterate
of Con.
1. Introduction
It is a well-known empirical phenomenon that natural axiomatic theories are well-
ordered by their consistency strength. However, without a precise mathematical
definition of “natural,” it is difficult to explain this observation in a strictly math-
ematical way. One expression of this phenomenon comes from ordinal analysis, a
research program whereby recursive ordinals are assigned to theories as a measure-
ment of their consistency strength. One method for calculating the proof-theoretic
ordinal of a theory T involves demonstrating that T can be approximated over a
weak base theory by a class of formulas that are well understood. In particular, the
Π01 fragments of natural theories are often proof-theoretically equivalent to iterated
consistency statements over a weak base theory, making these theories amenable to
ordinal analysis. For discussion, see, e.g., Beklemishev [4, 5] and Joosten [10].
Why are the Π01 fragments of natural theories proof-theoretically equivalent to
iterated consistency statements? Our approach to this question is inspired by Mar-
tin’s approach to another famous question from mathematical logic: why are natu-
ral Turing degrees well-ordered by Turing reducibility? Martin conjectured that (i)
the non-constant degree invariant functions meeting a certain simplicity condition
(f P LpRq)1 are pre-well-ordered by the relation “fpaq ďT gpaq on a cone in the
Turing degrees” and (ii) the successor for this well-ordering is induced by the Tur-
ing jump. Martin’s conjecture is meant to capture the idea that the Turing jump
and its iterates into the transfinite are the only natural non-trivial degree invariant
functions.
In this paper we investigate analogous hypotheses concerning jumps on consistent
axiomatic theories, namely, consistency statements. We fix elementary arithmetic
EA as our base theory. EA is a subsystem of PA that is often used as a base theory
in ordinal analysis and in which standard approaches to arithmetization of syntax
can be carried out without substantial changes; see [6] for details. We write rϕs to
denote the equivalence class of ϕ modulo EA-provable equivalence. We write ϕ $ ψ
Thanks to Matthew Harrison-Trainor for simplifying the proof of Lemma 7.1. We extend spe-
cial thanks to V. Yu. Shavrukov and Albert Visser for their extensive and very helpful comments
and suggestions.
1Martin’s Conjecture is stated under the hypothesis ZF`AD`DC, which is satisfied by LpRq
assuming that there are ω many Woodin cardinals with a measurable above them all.
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if EA $ ϕ Ñ ψ and say that ϕ implies ψ. If ϕ $ ψ but ψ & ϕ we say that ϕ
strictly implies ψ. The Lindenbaum algebra of EA is the set of equivalence classes
of sentences ordered by $. We focus on recursive functions f that are monotonic,
i.e.,
if ϕ $ ψ, then fpϕq $ fpψq.
We note that (i) a function f is monotonic just in case f preserves implication over
EA and (ii) all monotonic functions induce functions on the Lindenbaum algebra
of EA. We adopt the convention that all functions named “f” in this paper are
recursive.
Our goal is to demonstrate that ϕ ÞÑ pϕ ^ Conpϕqq and its iterates into the
transfinite are canonical among monotonic functions. Our first theorem to this end
is the following.
Theorem 1.1. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all consistent ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conpϕq implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ.
Then for every true ϕ, there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and rfpψqs “ rψ^Conpψqs.
Corollary 1.2. There is no monotonic function f such that for all consistent ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conpϕq strictly implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ.
We note that this result depends essentially on the condition of monotonicity.
Shavrukov and Visser [13] studied recursive functions f that are extensional over
the Lindenbaum algebra of PA, i.e.,
if PA $ pϕØ ψq, then PA $ pfpϕq Ø fpψqq,
and proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1.3. (Shavrukov–Visser) There is a recursive extensional function f
such that for all consistent ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conpϕq strictly implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ.
In particular, Shavrukov and Visser proved that for any consistent ϕ, the sentence
ϕ‹ :“ ϕ^ @x
`
ConpIΣx ` ϕq Ñ ConpIΣx ` ϕ` ConpIΣx ` ϕqq
˘
has deductive strength strictly between ϕ and ϕ^Conpϕq, and that the map ϕ ÞÑ ϕ‹
is extensional. By a theorem of Kripke and Pour-El [11], the Lindenbaum algebras of
PA and EA are effectively isomorphic, whence Theorem 1.3 also applies to EA. Thus,
Corollary 1.2 cannot be strengthened by weakening the hypothesis of monotonicity
to the hypothesis of extensionality.
We also note that Friedman, Rathjen, and Weiermann [8] introduced a notion
of slow consistency with which they produced a Π01 sentence SlowConpPAq with
deductive strength strictly between PA and PA`ConpPAq. In general, the statement
SlowConpϕq has the form
@xpFǫ0pxq ÓÑ ConpIΣx ` ϕqq
where Fǫ0 is a standard representation of a recursive function that is not provably
total in PA. This is not in conflict with Corollary 1.2, however, since ϕ ^ Conpϕq
and ϕ ^ SlowConpϕq are provably equivalent for all ϕ such that ϕ $ @xFǫ0pxq Ó.
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On the other hand, changing the definition of the SlowConpϕq so that the function
in the antecedent varies with the input ϕ results in a map that is not monotonic.
Theorem 1.1 generalizes to the iterates of Con into the effective transfinite. For
an elementary presentation α of a recursive well-ordering (see Definition 3.1) and
a sentence ϕ, we define sentences Conβpϕq for every β ă α.
Con
0pϕq :“J
Con
β`1pϕq :“Conpϕ^ Conβpϕqq
Con
λpϕq :“@β ă λpConβpϕqq
For a precise definition using Gödel’s fixed point lemma, see Definition 3.2. Note
that for every ϕ, rCon1pϕqs “ rConpϕqs.
Remark 1.4. We warn the reader that there is some discrepancy between our no-
tation and the notation used by other authors. Our iteration scheme Conα`1pϕq ”
Conpϕ^ Conαpϕqq is sometimes denoted ConppEA ` ϕqαq, e.g., [2]. Moreoever, the
notation Conα`1pϕq is sometimes used to denote ConpConαpϕqq, e.g., [3].
With each predicate Conα we associate a function
ϕ ÞÑ pϕ^ Conαpϕqq.
Theorem 1.1 then generalizes into the effective transfinite as follows.
Theorem 1.5. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conαpϕq implies fpϕq,
(ii) if rfpϕqs ‰ rKs, then fpϕq strictly implies ϕ^ Conβpϕq for all β ă α.
Then for every true ϕ, there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and rfpψqs “ rψ^Conαpψqs.
Corollary 1.6. There is no monotonic f such that for all ϕ, if rϕ^Conαpϕqs ‰ rKs,
then both
(i) ϕ^ Conαpϕq strictly implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ^ Conβpϕq for all β ă α.
Thus, if the range of a monotonic function f is sufficiently constrained, then for
some ϕ and some α,
rfpϕqs “ rϕ^ Conαpϕqs ‰ rKs.
This property still holds even when these constraints on the range of f are relaxed
considerably. More precisely, if a monotonic function is everywhere bounded by a
finite iterate of Con, then it must be somewhere equivalent to an iterate of Con.
Theorem 1.7. Let f be a monotonic function such that for every ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Connpϕq implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq implies ϕ.
Then for some ϕ and some k ď n, rfpϕqs “ rϕ^ Conkpϕqs ‰ rKs.
To generalize this result into the effective transfinite, we focus on a particular
class of monotonic functions that we call Π01.
Definition 1.8. A function f is Π01 if fpϕq P Π
0
1 for all ϕ.
Our main theorem is the following: if a monotonic function is everywhere bounded
by a transfinite iterate of Con, then it must be somewhere equivalent to an iterate
of Con. This to say that the iterates of the consistency operator are inevitable; no
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monotonic function that is everywhere bounded by some iterate of Con can avoid
all of the iterates of Con.
Theorem 1.9. Let ϕ ÞÑ fpϕq be a monotonic Π01 function Then either
(i) for some β ď α and some ϕ, rϕ^ fpϕqs “ rϕ^ Conβpϕqs ‰ rKs or
(ii) for some ϕ, pϕ^ Conαpϕqq & fpϕq.
The main theorem bears a striking similarity to the following theorem of Slaman
and Steel [14].
Theorem 1.10. (Slaman–Steel) Suppose f : 2ω Ñ 2ω is Borel, order-preserving
with respect to ďT , and increasing on a cone. Then for any α ă ω1 either
(i) for some β ď α, fpxq ”T x
pβq cofinally or
(ii) pxpαq ăT fpxqq cofinally.
There are two notable disanalogies between Theorem 1.9 and Theorem 1.10.
First, Theorem 1.9 guarantees only that sufficiently constrained functions are some-
where equivalent to an iterate of Con, whereas Theorem 1.10 guarantees cofinal
equivalence with an iterate of the Turing jump. Second, by assuming AD, Slaman
and Steel inferred that this behavior happens not only cofinally but also on a cone
in the Turing degrees. There is no obvious analogue of AD from which one can infer
that if cofinally many Lindenbaum degrees have a property then every element in
some non-trivial ideal of Lindenbaum degrees has that property.
We then turn our attention to a generalization of consistency, namely, 1-consistency.
Recall that a theory T is 1-consistent if T is consistent with the true Π01 the-
ory of arithmetic. Just as the Π01 fragments of natural theories are often proof-
theoretically equivalent to iterated consistency statements over a weak base theory,
the Π02 fragments of natural theories are often proof-theoretically equivalent to it-
erated 1-consistency statements over a weak base theory
Conservativity theorems relating 1-consistency and iterated consistency play an
important role in the proof-theoretic analysis of arithmetic theories. For instance,
it is a consequence of Beklemshev’s reduction principle [6] that for any Π01 ϕ,
EA` 1ConpEAq $ ϕ if and only if EA` tConkpEAq : k ă ωu $ ϕ.
This fact plays an integral role in Beklemishev’s [5] consistency proof of PA. We
show that this conservativity result is drastically violated in the limit. For functions
f and g, we say that f majorizes g if there is a consistent ϕ such that for all ψ, if
ψ $ ϕ then fpψq $ gpψq; if in addition ϕ is true then we say that f majorizes g on
a true ideal.
Proposition 1.11. For any elementary presentation α of a recursive well-ordering,
1Con majorizes Conα on a true ideal.
It is tempting to conjecture on the basis of this result that 1Con is the weakest
monotonic function majorizing each Conα for α a recursive well-ordering. We prove
that this is not the case.
Theorem 1.12. There are infinitely many monotonic functions f such that for
every recursive ordinal α, there is an elementary presentation a of α such that f
majorizes Cona on a true ideal but also 1Con majorizes f on a true ideal.
Theorem 1.1 demonstrates that for any monotonic f with a sufficiently con-
strained range, f must agree cofinally with Con. We would like to strengthen
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cofinally to on a true ideal. One strategy for establishing this claim would be to
show that every set that is closed under EA provable equivalence and that contains
cofinally many true sentences also contains every sentence in some true ideal. We
show that this strategy fails.
Proposition 1.13. There is a recursively enumerable set A that contains arbitrar-
ily strong true sentences and that is closed under EA provable equivalence but does
not contain any true ideals.
It is not clear whether Theorem 1.1 can be strengthened in the desired manner.
2. No monotonic function is strictly between the identity and Con
In this section we prove that no monotonic function sends every consistent ϕ to
a sentence with deductive strength strictly between ϕ and pϕ ^ Conpϕqq. Most of
the work is contained in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let f be a monotonic function such that for all consistent ϕ, fpϕq
strictly implies ϕ. Then for every true sentence ϕ there is a true sentence θ such
that θ $ ϕ and fpθq $ pθ ^ Conpθqq.
Proof. Let f be as in the statement of the theorem. By assumption the following
statement is true.
χ :“ @ζpConpζq Ñ pζ & fpζqqq
Let ϕ be a true sentence. Then the sentence ψ :“ ϕ^ χ is true. Let
θ :“ pψ ^ pfpψq Ñ Conpψqqq.
Note that θ $ ϕ.
Claim. fpθq $ pθ ^ fpψqq.
Clearly θ $ ψ. So fpθq $ fpψq since f is monotonic. Also fpθq $ θ by assump-
tion.
Claim. pθ ^ fpψqq $ pψ ^ Conpψqq.
Immediate from the definition of θ.
Claim. pψ ^ Conpψqq $ pθ ^ Conpθqq.
Clearly pψ ^ Conpψqq $ θ. It suffices to show that
pψ ^ Conpψqq $ Conpθq.
We reason as follows.
pψ ^ Conpψqq $ @ζpConpζq Ñ pζ & fpζqqq by choice of ψ.
$ Conpψq Ñ pψ & fpψqq by instantiation.
$ pψ & fpψqq by logic.
$ Conpψ ^ fpψqq.
$ Conpθq by the definition of θ.
It is immediate from the preceding claims that fpθq $ pθ ^ Conpθqq. ❑
A number of results follow immediately from the lemma.
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Theorem 2.2. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all consistent ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conpϕq implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ.
Then for every true ϕ, there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and rfpψqs “ rψ^Conpψqs.
Proof. By the lemma, for every true ϕ there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and
fpψq $ pψ ^ Conpψqq. Since we are assuming that pψ ^ Conpψqq $ fpψq, it follows
that rfpψqs “ rψ ^ Conpψqs. ❑
We note that this theorem applies to a number of previously studied operators.
For instance, the theorem applies to the notion of cut-free consistency, i.e., con-
sistency with respect to cut-free proofs. EA does not prove the cut-elimination
theorem, which is equivalent to the totality of super-exponentiation (over EA), and
does not prove the equivalence of cut-free consistency and consistency. Another
such operator is the Friedman-Rathjen-Weiermann slow consistency operator dis-
cussed in §1. Theorem 2.2 implies that these operators exhibit the same behavior
as the consistency operator “in the limit.” Indeed, for any ϕ such that ϕ proves the
cut-elimination theorem, ϕ^Conpϕq and ϕ^ConCFpϕq are EA-provably equivalent.
Likewise, for any ϕ that proves the totality of Fǫ0 , ϕ^Conpϕq and ϕ^ SlowConpϕq
are EA-provably equivalent.
As a corollary of Theorem 2.2 we note that no monotonic function reliably pro-
duces sentences strictly between those produced by the identity and by Con.
Corollary 2.3. There is no monotonic function f such that for all consistent ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conpϕq strictly implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ.
Shavrukov and Visser [13] studied functions over Lindenbaum algberas and dis-
covered a recursive extensional uniform density function g for the Lindenbaum
algebra of EA, i.e., (i) for any ϕ and ψ such that ψ strictly implies ϕ, gpxϕ, ψyq is a
sentence with deductive strength strictly between ϕ and ψ and (ii) if EA $ pϕØ ψq
then, for any θ, rgpxϕ, θyqs “ rgpxψ, θyqs and rgpxθ, ϕyqs “ rgpxθ, ψyqs. They asked
whether this result could be strengthened by exhibiting a recursive uniform density
function that is monotonic in both its coordinates. As a corollary of our theorem
we answer their question negatively.
Corollary 2.4. There is no monotonic uniform density function for the Linden-
baum algebra of EA.
Proof. Suppose there were such a function g over the Lindenbaum algebra of EA.
Then given any input of the form xϕ, pϕ^Conpϕqqy, g would produce a sentence with
deductive strength strictly between ϕ and pϕ^Conpϕqq. We then note that f : ϕ ÞÑ
gpxϕ, pϕ^Conpϕqqyq is monotonic, but that for every consistent ϕ, ϕ^Conpϕq strictly
implies fpϕq and fpϕq strictly implies ϕ, contradicting the previous theorem. ❑
Our negative answer to the question raised by Shavrukov and Visser makes use of
a Π02 sentence @ζpConpζq Ñ pζ & fpζqqq. Shavrukov and Visser raised the following
question in private communication.
Question 2.5. Is there a recursive uniform density function for the lattice of Π01
sentences over EA that is monotonic in both its coordinates?
ON THE INEVITABILITY OF THE CONSISTENCY OPERATOR 7
Remark 2.6. It is clear from the proof of the lemma that any monotonic f meeting
the hypotheses of the theorem is not only cofinally equivalent to Con; for every true
ϕ that implies
χ :“ @ζpConpζq Ñ pζ & fpζqqq,
there is a true ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and rϕ^ Conpϕqs “ rψ ^ Conpψqs “ rfpψqs.
This observation points the way toward a corollary of our theorem; namely that
any monotonic function strictly meeting the hypotheses of the theorem must have
the same range as ϕ ÞÑ pϕ ^ Conpϕqq in the limit. To prove this, we first prove a
version of jump inversion—Con inversion—for Lindenbaum algebras. This is to say
that the range of Con contains a true ideal in the Lindenbaum algebra. A similar
result is established for true Π02 sentences in [1].
Proposition 2.7. Suppose ϕ $ ConpJq. Then for some ψ, rϕs “ rpψ ^ Conpψqqs.
Proof. Let ψ :“ ConpJq Ñ ϕ.
Claim. ϕ $ pψ ^ Conpψqq.
Trivially, ϕ $ ψ. Since ϕ $ ConpJq, it follows that from the formalized second
incompleteness theorem, i.e., ConpJq $ Conp ConpJqq, that ϕ $ Conp ConpJqq.
But  ConpJq is the first disjunct of ψ, so ϕ $ Conpψq.
Claim. pψ ^ Conpψqq $ ϕ.
Note that Conpψq $ ConpJq. The claim then follows since clearly pψ^ConpJqq $
ϕ. ❑
Corollary 2.8. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all consistent ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conpϕq implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ.
Then the intersection of the ranges of f and Con in the Lindenbaum algebra contains
a true ideal.
Proof. Let ϕ be a sentence such that ϕ $ ConpJq and
ϕ $ @ζpConpζq Ñ pζ & fpζqqq.
Note that both of these sentences are true, and hence ϕ is in an element of a true
ideal. By the previous theorem, there is a ψ such that rψ ^ Conpψqs “ rϕs. By
Remark 2.6 there is a θ such that rfpθqs “ rψ ^ Conpψqs “ rθ ^ Conpθqs. ❑
3. Iterating Con into the transfinite
By analogy with Martin’s Conjecture, we would like to show that there is a
natural well-ordered hierarchy of monotonic functions and that the successor for
this well-ordering is induced by Con. Thus, we define the iterates of Con along
elementary presentations of well-orderings.
Definition 3.1. By an elementary presentation of a recursive well-ordering we
mean a pair pD,ăq of elementary formulas, such that (i) the relation ă well-orders
D in the standard model of arithmetic and (ii) EA proves that ă linearly orders
the elements satisfying D, and (iii) it is elementarily calculable whether an element
represents zero or a successor or a limit.
8 ANTONIO MONTALBÁN AND JAMES WALSH
Definition 3.2. Given an elementary presentation xα,ăy of a recursive well-
ordering and a sentence ϕ, we use Gödel’s fixed point lemma to define sentences
Con‹pϕ, βq for β ă α as follows.
EA $ Con‹pϕ, βq Ø @γ ă β,Conpϕ^Con‹pϕ, γqq.
We use the notation Conβpϕq for Con‹pϕ, βq.
Remark 3.3. Note that, since it is elementarily calculable whether a number repre-
sents zero or a successor or a limit, the following clauses are provable in EA.
‚ Con0pϕq Ø J
‚ Conγ`1pϕq Ø Conpϕ^ Conγpϕqq
‚ Conλpϕq Ø @γ ă λ,Conγpϕq for λ a limit.
Note that this hierarchy is proper for true ϕ by Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem. We need to prove that for transfinite α, Conα is monotonic over the
Lindenbaum algebra of EA. Before proving this claim we recall Schmerl’s [12]
technique of reflexive transfinite induction. Note that “Prpϕq” means that ϕ is
provable in EA.
Proposition 3.4. (Schmerl) Suppose that ă is an elementary linear order and that
EA $ @αpPrp@β ă α,Apβqq Ñ Apαqq. Then EA $ @αApαq.
Proof. From EA $ @αpPrp@β ă α,Apβqq Ñ Apαqq we infer
EA $ Prp@αApαqq Ñ @αPrp@β ă α,Apβqq
Ñ @αApαq.
Löb’s theorem, i.e.,
if EA $ Prpζq Ñ ζ, then EA $ ζ,
then yields EA $ @αApαq. ❑
Proposition 3.5. If ϕ $ ψ, then Conαpϕq $ Conαpψq.
Proof. Let Apβq denote the claim that Conβpϕq $ Conβpψq.
We want to prove that Apαq, without placing any restrictions on α. We prove
the equivalent claim that EA $ Apαq. By Proposition 3.4, it suffices to show that
EA $ @αpPrp@β ă α,Apβqq Ñ Apαqq.
Reason within EA. Suppose that Prp@β ă α,Apβqq, which is to say that
Prp@β ă α, pConβpϕq $ Conβpψqqq.
Since Conαpϕq contains EA, we infer that
Con
αpϕq $ @β ă αpConβpϕq $ Conβpψqq,
which is just to say that
Con
αpϕq $
`
@β ă α,EA $ pConβpϕq Ñ Conβpψqq
˘
.
Since Conαpϕq proves that for all β ă α, EA &  Conβpϕq we infer that
Con
αpϕq $ @β ă αpEA &  Conβpψqq.
EA proves its own Σ01 completeness, i.e., EA proves that if EA does not prove a Σ
0
1
statement ζ, then ζ is false. Thus,
Con
αpϕq $ @β ă αpConβpψqq.
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This concludes the proof of the proposition. ❑
Thus, for each predicate Conα the function
ϕ ÞÑ pϕ^ Conαpϕqq
is monotonic over the Lindenbaum algebra of EA.
In this section we show that the functions given by iterated consistency are
minimal with respect to each other. We fix an elementary presentation α of a
recursive well-ordering. We assume that f is a monotonic function such that for
every consistent ϕ, fpϕq strictly implies ϕ ^ Conβpϕq for all β ă α. We would like
to relativize the proof of Lemma 2.1 to Conβ . However, the proof of Lemma 2.1
relied on the truth of the principle
@ζpConpζq Ñ pζ & fpζqqq, i.e.,
@ζpConpζq Ñ Conpζ ^ fpζqqq.
It is not in general clear that Conαpϕq implies Conαpϕ ^  fpϕqq. To solve this
problem, we define a sequence of true sentences pθβqβďα such that for every sentence
ϕ, if ϕ $ θβ then Con
βpϕq implies Conβpϕ^ fpϕqq. Thus, we are able to relativize
the proof of Lemma 2.1 for Conβ to sentences that imply θβ .
Definition 3.6. Given an elementary presentation α of a recursive well-ordering,
we use effective transfinite recursion to define a sequence of sentences pθβqβďα.
θ1 :“ @ζpConpζq Ñ Conpζ ^ fpζqqq
θβ :“ @γ ă βpTrueΠ3pθγqq ^ @ζ
``
@γ ă βpζ $ θγq
˘
Ñ
`
Con
βpζq Ñ Conβpζ ^ fpζqq
˘˘
.
Remark 3.7. Note that every sentence in the sequence pθβqβďα has complexity Π
0
3.
Note moreover that for a successor β ` 1, θβ`1 is equivalent to
θβ ^ @ζ
`
pζ $ θβq Ñ
`
Con
β`1pζq Ñ Conβ`1pζ ^ fpζqq
˘˘
.
Lemma 3.8. Let f be monotonic such that, for all ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conαpϕq implies fpϕq,
(ii) if rfpϕqs ‰ rKs, then fpϕq strictly implies ϕ^ Conβpϕq for all β ă α.
Then for each β ď α, the sentence θβ is true.
Proof. Let f be as in the statement of the lemma. We prove the claim by induction
on β ď α. The base case β “ 1 is trivial.
For the successor case we assume that β ă α and that θβ is true; we want
to show that θβ`1 is true. So let ζ be a sentence such that ζ $ θβ. We want to
show that Conβ`1pζq implies Conβ`1pζ^ fpζqq. We prove the contrapositive, that
 Conβ`1pζ ^ fpζqq implies  Conβ`1pζq. So suppose  Conβ`1pζ ^ fpζqq, i.e.,
(:) ζ ^ fpζq $  Conβpζ ^ fpζqq.
We reason as follows.
Since ζ $ θβ , ζ $ @γ ă β,TrueΠ3pθγq. From this we infer
(‹) ζ $ pζ $ @γ ă β,TrueΠ3pθγqq
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by Σ01 completeness. Moreover, since ζ $ θβ,
ζ $ @ϕ
``
@γ ă βpϕ $ θγq
˘
Ñ
`
Con
βpϕq Ñ Conβpϕ^ fpϕqq
˘˘
by the definition of θβ .
$ @γ ă β
`
ζ $ θγ
˘
Ñ
`
Con
βpζq Ñ Conβpζ ^ fpζqq
˘
by instantiation.
$ Conβζ Ñ Conβpζ ^ fpζqq by (‹).
ζ ^ fpζq $  Conβpζ ^ fpζqq by (:).
$  Conβpζq by logic.
ζ $ Conβpζq Ñ fpζq by logic.
Thus, pζ ^ Conβpζqq $ fpζq. Since fpϕq always strictly implies ϕ ^ Conβpϕq, we
infer that
rζ ^ Conβpζqs “ rKs.
This is to say that  Conβ`1pζq.
For the limit case we let β be a limit ordinal and assume that for every γ ă β,
θγ is true. We want to show that θβ is true. Let ζ be a sentence such that for every
γ ă β, ζ $ θγ . We want to show that Con
βpζq implies Conβpζ^ fpζqq. So assume
that Conβpζq, i.e., for every γ ă β,Conγpζq. Let γ ă β. Since β is a limit ordinal,
γ ` 1 ă β. So by the inductive hypothesis θγ`1 is true. That is, by the definition
of θγ`1,
@ϕ
`
pϕ $ θγq Ñ pCon
γpϕq Ñ Conγpϕ^ fpϕqqq
˘
.
By instantiation, we infer that
pζ $ θγq Ñ pCon
γpζq Ñ Conγpζ ^ fpζqqq.
Since ζ $ θγ and Con
γpζq, this means that Conγpζ ^ fpζqq. Since γ was a generic
ordinal less than β, we get that
@γ ă β,Conγpζ ^ fpζqq,
i.e., Conβpζq. This completes the proof of the lemma. ❑
Theorem 3.9. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conαpϕq implies fpϕq,
(ii) if rfpϕqs ‰ rKs, then fpϕq strictly implies ϕ^ Conβpϕq for all β ă α.
Then for every true χ, there is a true ψ such that ψ $ χ and rfpψqs “ rψ^Conαpψqs.
Proof. Let χ be a true sentence. By the lemma, θα is true. So
ϕ :“ χ^ θα
is true. We let
ψ :“ ϕ^ pfpϕq Ñ Conαpϕqq.
Note that ψ $ χ. We now show that rψ ^ Conαpψqs “ rfpψqs.
Claim. fpψq $ pψ ^ fpϕqq.
Since f is monotonic.
Claim. pψ ^ fpϕqq $ pϕ^ Conαpϕqq.
By the definition of ψ.
Claim. pϕ^ Conαpϕqq $ pψ ^ Conαpψqq.
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It is clear from the definition of ψ that pϕ^Conαpϕqq $ ψ. So it suffices to show
that pϕ ^ Conαpϕqq $ Conαpψq.
ϕ^ Conαpϕq $ @ζ
``
@β ă αpζ $ θβq
˘
Ñ
`
Con
αpζq Ñ Conαpζ ^ fpζqq
˘˘
by choice of ϕ.
$ @β ă αpϕ $ θβq Ñ
`
Con
αpϕq Ñ Conαpϕ^ fpϕqq
˘
by instantiation.
$ @β ă αpϕ $ θβq Ñ Con
αpϕ^ fpϕqq by logic.
Since Conαpϕ ^  fpϕqq $ Conαpψq, to prove the desired claim it suffices to show
that
ϕ^ Conαpϕq $ @β ă αpϕ $ θβq.
We reason as follows.
ϕ $ θα by choice of ϕ.
$ @β ă αpTrueΠ3θβq by definition of θα.
$ pϕ $ @β ă αpTrueΠ3θβqq by Σ
0
1 completeness.
$ @β ă αpϕ $ TrueΠ3θβq
$ @β ă αpϕ $ θβq
It is immediate from the preceding claims that fpψq $ ψ^Conαpψq. By assumption,
ψ ` Conαpψq $ fpψq, so it follows that rfpψqs “ rψ ^ Conαpψqs. ❑
Corollary 3.10. There is no monotonic f such that for all ϕ, if rϕ^ Conαpϕqs ‰
rKs, then both
(i) ϕ^ Conαpϕq strictly implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq strictly implies ϕ^ Conβpϕq for all β ă α.
4. Finite iterates of Con are inevitable
In this section and the next section we prove that the iterates of Con are, in a
sense, inevitable. First we show that, for every natural number n, if a monotonic
function f is always bounded by Conn, then it is somewhere equivalent to Conk
for some k ď n. In §5, we turn to generalizations of this result into the effective
transfinite.
Theorem 4.1. Let f be a monotonic function such that for every ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Connpϕq implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq implies ϕ.
Then for some ϕ and some k ď n, rfpϕqs “ rϕ^ Conkpϕqs ‰ rKs.
Proof. We suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no ψ and no k ď n such
that rfpψqs “ rψ ^ Conkpψqs ‰ rKs. We then let ϕ1 be a true statement such that
ϕ1 $ @ζpConpζq Ñ Conpζ ^ fpζqqq
ϕ1 $ @k@ζ
`
Con
k`1pζq Ñ  Pr
`
pζ ^ Conkpζqq Ø fpζq
˘˘
.
The first condition is that ϕ1 proves that for every consistent ϕ, fpϕq strictly
implies ϕ. The second condition is that ϕ1 proves that fpζq never coincides with
ζ ^ Conkpζq, unless rζ ^ Conkpζqs “ rKs.
We define a sequence of statements, starting with ϕ1, as follows:
ϕk`1 :“ ϕk ^ pfpϕkq Ñ Con
kpϕkqq.
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Note that each sentence of the form ϕk. We will use our assumption to show
that, for all k, ϕk ^ Con
kpϕkq $ Con
kpϕk`1q. From this we will deduce that
rfpϕn`1qs “ rϕn`1 ^ Con
npϕn`1qs ‰ rKs, contradicting the assumption that f and
Con
n never coincide. Most of the work is contained in the proof of the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.2. For all k, for all j ě k, rϕk ^ Con
kpϕkqs $ rCon
kpϕjqs.
Proof. We prove the claim by a double induction. The primary induction is on k.
For the base case k “ 1, we prove the claim by induction on j. The base case j “ 1
follows trivially. For the inductive step we assume that rϕ1^Conpϕ1qs $ rConpϕjqs
and show that rϕ1 ^ Conpϕ1qs $ rConpϕj`1qs.
ϕ1 ^ Conpϕ1q $ @ζpConpζq Ñ Conpζ ^ fpζqqq by choice of ϕ1.
$ Conpϕjq Ñ Conpϕj ^ fpϕjqq by instantiation.
ϕ1 ^ Conpϕ1q $ Conpϕjq by the inductive hypothesis.
$ Conpϕj ^ fpϕjqq by logic.
$ Conpϕj`1q by definition of ϕj`1.
For the inductive step we assume that the claim is true of k ´ 1, i.e.,
@j ě k ´ 1
``
ϕk´1 ^ Con
k´1pϕk´1q
˘
$
`
Con
k´1pϕjq
˘˘
.
We prove the claim for k. Once again, we prove the claim by induction on j.
The base case j “ k follows trivially. For the inductive step we assume that ϕk ^
Con
kpϕkq $ Con
kpϕjq. We want to prove that ϕk ^ Con
kpϕkq $ Con
kpϕj`1q.
ϕk ^ Con
kpϕkq $ @x@ζ
`
Con
x`1pζq Ñ  Pr
`
pζ ^ Conxpζqq Ø fpζq
˘˘
by choice of ϕ1.
$ Conkpϕjq Ñ  Pr
`
pϕj ^ Con
k´1pϕjqq Ø fpϕjq
˘
by instantiation.
ϕk ^ Con
kpϕkq $ Con
kpϕjq by the inner inductive hypothesis.
$  Pr
`
pϕj ^ Con
k´1pϕjqq Ø fpϕjq
˘
by logic.
Thus, ϕk ^ Con
kpϕkq proves that one of the following cases holds.
pϕj ^ Con
k´1pϕjqq & fpϕjq
fpϕjq & pϕj ^ Con
k´1ϕjq
We now show that ϕk ^ Con
kpϕkq refutes the second option.
Claim. ϕk ^ Con
kpϕkq $
`
fpϕjq $ pϕj ^ Con
k´1ϕjq
˘
.
By the outer inductive hypothesis, EA proves the following conditional:
θ :“
`
pϕj´1 ^ Con
k´1pϕj´1qq Ñ pCon
k´1pϕjqq
˘
.
Thus, fpϕjq (which contains EA) also proves θ. We now show that fpϕjq $
Con
k´1pϕjq.
fpϕjq $ ϕj ^ fpϕj´1q since f is monotonic.
$ pϕj´1 ^ pfpϕj´1q Ñ Con
j´1pϕj´1qqq ^ fpϕj´1q by the definition of ϕj .
$ ϕj´1 ^ Con
j´1pϕj´1q by logic.
$ ϕj´1 ^ Con
k´1pϕj´1q since j ě k.
$ Conk´1pϕjq since fpϕjq proves θ.
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By Σ01 completeness, pϕk ^ Con
kpϕkqq $
`
fpϕjq $ Con
k´1pϕjq
˘
.
Claim. pϕk ^ Con
kpϕkqq $ Con
kpϕj`1q.
We reason as follows.
pϕk ^ Con
kpϕkqq $
`
pϕj ^ Con
k´1pϕjqq & fpϕjq
˘
by the previous claim.
$ Conpϕj ^ fpϕjq ^ Con
k´1pϕjqq.
$ Conpϕj`1 ^ Con
k´1pϕjqq by the definition of ϕj`1.
$ Conpϕj`1 ^ Con
k´1pϕj`1qq by the outer inductive hypothesis.
$ Conkpϕj`1q by definition of Con
k.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. ❑
As an instance of the lemma, we get that pϕn ^ Con
npϕnqq $ Con
npϕn`1q. We
reason as follows.
fpϕn`1q $ ϕn ^ pfpϕnq Ñ Con
npϕnqq by the definition of ϕn`1.
fpϕn`1q $ fpϕnq since f is monotonic.
$ Connpϕnq by logic.
$ Connpϕn`1q by the lemma.
On the other hand, ϕn`1 ^ Con
npϕn`1q $ fpϕn`1q since f is everywhere bounded
by Conn. Thus, rfpϕn`1qs “ rϕn`1 ^ Con
npϕn`1qs, contradicting the assumption
that there is no ψ and no k ď n such that rfpψqs “ rψ ^ Conkpψqs ‰ rKs. ❑
5. Transfinite iterates of Con are inevitable.
Generalizing the proof of Theorem 4.1 into the transfinite poses the following
difficulty. Recall that the proof of Theorem 4.1 makes use of a sequence of sentences
starting with ϕ1 where
ϕk`1 :“ ϕk ^ pfpϕkq Ñ Con
kpϕkqq.
It is not clear what the ωth sentence in the sequence should be. A natural idea is
that for a limit ordinal λ the corresponding “limit sentence” should quantify over
the sentences in the sequence beneath it and express, roughly,
@γ ă λ
`
Truepϕγq ^ pTruepfpϕγqq Ñ Con
γpϕγqq
˘
.
However, if the sentences in the sequence pϕγqγăλ have unbounded syntactic com-
plexity, then we are not guaranteed to have a truth-predicate with which we can
quantify over them.
Nevertheless, we show that Theorem 4.1 generalizes into the transfinite given
an additional assumption on complexity. Note that ϕ ÞÑ pϕ ^ Conpϕqq can be
factored into two functions—the identity and ϕ ÞÑ Conpϕq—the latter of which
always produces a Π01 sentence. For the rest of this section, we will focus on
monotonic functions ϕ ÞÑ ϕ ^ fpϕq where f is monotonic and also fpϕq P Π01
for all ϕ.
Definition 5.1. A function f is Π01 if fpϕq P Π
0
1 for all ϕ.
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For the next theorem we fix an elementary presentation Γ of a recursive well-
ordering. In the statement of the theorem and throughout the proof α, β, γ, δ, etc.
are names of ordinals from the notation system Γ.
Theorem 5.2. Let f be a monotonic Π01 function. Then either
(i) for some β ď α and some ϕ, rϕ^ fpϕqs “ rϕ^ Conβpϕqs ‰ rKs or
(ii) for some ϕ, pϕ^ Conαpϕqq & fpϕq.
Proof. Let f be a monotonic Π01 function such that for every ϕ,
pϕ^ Conαpϕqq $ pϕ^ fpϕqq.
We assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is no sentence ζ and no β ď α
such that rζ ^ Conβpζqs “ rζ ^ fpζqs ‰ rKs. We then let ϕ be the conjunction of
the following four sentences.
@ζpConpζq Ñ Conpζ ^ fpζqqq
@β ď α@ζ
`
Con
βpζq Ñ @δ ă β, Pr
`
pζ ^ Conδpζqq Ø pζ ^ fpζqq
˘˘
@ζ@ηppζ $ ηq Ñ pfpζq $ fpηqqq
@x
`
PrpTrueΠ0
2
pxqq Ñ TrueΠ0
2
pxq
˘
The first expresses that for every consistent ϕ, fpϕq strictly implies ϕ. The
second sentence expresses that if β ă α, then fpζq and ζ ^Conβpζq never coincide,
unless rζ ^ Conβpζqs “ rKs . The third sentence expresses the monotonicity of f .
The fourth sentence expresses the Π02 soundness of EA. Note that each of these
sentences is true, so their conjunction ϕ is also true. Each of the four sentences is
Π02, whence so is ϕ.
We are interested in the following sequence pϕβqβďΓ. Note that the sentences in
the sequence pϕβqβďΓ all have complexity Π
0
2. Note moreover that since ϕ1 is true,
so is ϕβ for every β.
ϕ1 :“ ϕ.
ϕγ :“ ϕ1 ^ @δ ă γ
`
TrueΠ1pfpϕδqq Ñ Con
δpϕδq
˘
for γ ą 1.
Remark 5.3. We may assume that the ordinal notation system Γ is provably linear
in EA. Thus, EA $ @β ď α,@γ ă βpTrueΠ2pϕβq Ñ TrueΠ2pϕγqq.
Our goal is to show that
rϕα`1 ^ Con
αpϕα`1qs “ rϕα`1 ^ fpϕα`1qs
contradicting the assumption that f and Conα never coincide. The main lemmas
needed to prove this result are the following.
Lemma 5.4. EA $ @γ ď α
`
pϕγ ^ fpϕγqq $ ϕα
˘
.
Lemma 5.5. EA $ @β ď α@γ ď β
`
ϕβ ` Con
γpϕβq $ Con
γpϕβ ^ fpϕβqq
˘
.
Lemma 5.4 is needed to derive Lemma 5.5. We now show how we use Lemma
5.5 to derive Theorem 5.2. As an instance of Lemma 5.5, letting α “ β “ γ, we
infer that
EA $
`
ϕα ` Con
αpϕαq $ Con
αpϕα ^ fpϕαqq
˘
.
From the soundness of EA, we infer that
(¯) ϕα ` Con
αpϕαq $ Con
αpϕα ^ fpϕαqq.
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We then reason as follows.
ϕα`1 $ ϕα ^ pfpϕαq Ñ Con
αpϕαqq by the definition of ϕα`1.
fpϕα`1q $ fpϕαq since f is monotonic.
ϕα`1 ` fpϕα`1q $ ϕα ^ Con
αpϕαq by logic.
$ Conαpϕα`1q by ¯.
On the other hand, ϕα`1 ` Con
αpϕα`1q $ fpϕα`1q since f is everywhere bounded
by Conα. Since ϕ1 is true, so too is ϕα`1, whence we infer that
rϕα`1 ^ Con
αpϕα`1qs “ rϕα`1 ^ fpϕα`1qs ‰ rKs,
contradicting the claim that there is no sentence ζ and no β ď α such that rζ ^
Con
βpζqs “ rζ ^ fpζqs ‰ rKs. ❑
It remains to prove Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5. We devote one subsection to
each.
5.1. Proof of Lemma 5.4. In this subsection we prove Lemma 5.4. First we recall
the statement of the lemma.
Lemma 5.6. EA $ @γ ď α
`
pϕγ ^ fpϕγqq $ ϕα
˘
.
Proof. We reason in EA. Let γ ď α. We assume that
(η) TrueΠ2pϕγq ^  TrueΠ1pfpϕγqq.
We we want to derive ϕα, i.e.
ϕ1 ^ @σ ă αpTrueΠ1pfpϕσqq Ñ Con
σpϕσqq.
The first conjunct follows trivially from the assumption that TrueΠ2pϕγq. We now
prove the second conjunct of ϕα in two parts, first for all σ such that α ą σ ě γ
and then for all σ ă γ.
α ą σ ě γ : From the assumption that TrueΠ0
2
pϕγq we infer that ϕ1, whence
we infer that f is monotonic. Thus, for all δ ě γ, fpϕδq $ fpϕγq, i.e., EA $`
fpϕδq Ñ fpϕγq
˘
. From ϕ1 we also infer that EA is Π
0
2 sound, and so we infer
that for all δ ě γ, TrueΠ1pfpϕδqq Ñ TrueΠ1pfpϕγqq. From the assumption that
 TrueΠ1pfpϕγqq we then infer that for all δ ě γ,  TrueΠ1pfpϕδqq, whence for all
δ ě γ, TrueΠ1pfpϕδqq Ñ Con
δpϕδq.
σ ă γ : By Remark 5.3, η implies that
@σ ă γpTrueΠ1
`
fpϕσqq Ñ Con
σpϕσq
˘
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4. ❑
5.2. Proof of Lemma 5.5. In this subsection we prove Lemma 5.5. We recall the
statement of Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.7. EA $ @β ď α@γ ď β
`
ϕβ ` Con
γpϕβq $ Con
γpϕβ ^ fpϕβqq
˘
.
The proof of this lemma is importantly different from the proof of Lemma 4.2.
In particular, to push the induction through limit stages we need to know not
only that the inductive hypothesis is true but also that it is provable in EA. We
resolve this issue by using Schmerl’s technique of reflexive transfinite induction (see
Proposition 3.4).
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In the proof of the lemma, we let Cpγ, δq abbreviate the claim that
ϕδ ` Con
γpϕδq $ Con
γpϕδ ^ fpϕδqq.
Proof. We want to show that
EA $ @β ď αp@γ ď βpCpγ, βqqq.
By Proposition 3.4 it suffices to show that
EA $ @αpPrp@β ď α@γ ď βCpγ, βqq Ñ @γ ď αCpγ, αqq.2
Thus, we reason in EA and fix α. We assume that
(△) Prp@β ď α,@γ ď β, Cpγ, βqq.
We let γ ď α and we want to show that Cpγ, αq.
Since ϕα $ ϕ we infer that
(7) ϕα ` Con
γpϕαq $ @δ ă γ, Pr
`
pϕα ^ Con
δpϕαqq Ø pϕα ^ fpϕαqq
˘
.
We first note that both
ϕα $ @δ ă γpTrueΠ1pfpϕδqq Ñ Con
δpϕδqq by the definition of ϕα and also
ϕα ` fpϕαq $ @δ ă γpfpϕαq $ fpϕδqq since ϕ1 proves the monotonicity of f .
$ @δ ă γpEA $ pfpϕαq Ñ fpϕδqqq.
$ @δ ă γpfpϕαq Ñ TrueΠ1pfpϕδqqq since ϕ1 proves the Π
0
2 soundness of EA.
$ @δ ă γ,TrueΠ1pfpϕδqq by logic.
Thus, we may reason as follows.
ϕα ` fpϕαq $ @δ ă γ,Con
δpϕδq
$ @δ ă γ,Conδpϕδ ^ fpϕδqqq since (△) delivers Cpδ, δq.
$ @δ ă γ,Conδpϕαq by Lemma 5.4.
Thus, by Σ01 completeness,
EA $ @δ ă γ
`
ϕα ^ fpϕαq $ Con
δpϕαq
˘
.
Combined with (7), this delivers
ϕα ` Con
γpϕαq $ @δ ă γ
`
ϕα ` Con
δpϕαq & fpϕαq
˘
.
$ @δ ă γ,Conpϕα ^ fpϕαq ^ Con
δpϕαqq.
$ @δ ă γ,Con
`
ϕα ^ fpϕαq ^ Con
δpϕα ^ fpϕαqq
˘
since (△) delivers Cpδ, αq.
$ Conγpϕα ^ fpϕαqq.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.5. ❑
Theorem 5.2 shows the inevitability of the consistency operator. For a sufficiently
constrained monotonic function f , f and must coincide with an iterate of Con on
some non-trivial sentence. However, it is not clear from the proofs of Theorem 4.1
or Theorem 5.2 that f must coincide with Con on a true sentence.
2The reader might expect that we need to write “β ă α” instead of “β ď α” in the an-
tecedent for this to match the statement of Proposition 3.4. However, it is clear from the proof of
Proposition 3.4 that this suffices.
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Question 5.8. Let f be a monotonic Π01 function. Suppose that for every ϕ,
pϕ^ Conαpϕqq $ fpϕq.
Must there be some β ď α and some true ϕ such that
rϕ^ fpϕqs “ rϕ^ Conβpϕqs?
6. 1-consistency and iterated consistency
Just as the Π01 fragments of natural theories can often be approximated by it-
erated consistency statements, the Π02 fragments of natural theories can often be
approximated by iterated 1-consistency statements. A theory T is 1-consistent if
T ` ThΠ0
1
pNq is consistent. The 1-consistency of EA ` ϕ can be expressed by the
following Π02 sentence, 1Conpϕq:
@xpTrueΠ0
1
pxq Ñ Conpϕ^ TrueΠ0
1
pxqqq.
In this section, we investigate the relationship between 1-consistency and iterated
consistency. First, we show that 1Con majorizes every iterate of Conα.
Proposition 6.1. For any elementary presentation α of a recursive well ordering,
there is a true sentence ϕ such that for every ψ, if ψ $ ϕ, then pψ ^ 1Conpψqq
implies pψ ^ Conαpψqq. Moreover, if rψ ^ Conαpψqs ‰ rKs then pψ ^ 1Conpψqq
strictly implies pψ ^ Conαpψqq.
Proof. Let α be an elementary presentation of a recursive well-ordering. Let ϕ be a
true sentence such that ϕ $ TIαΠ0
1
, i.e., ϕ implies the validity of transfinite induction
along α for Π01 predicates. We prove that
pϕ^ 1Conpϕqq $ Conα`1pϕq.
Since ϕ^ 1Conpϕq $ TIαΠ0
1
, it suffices to show that:
Base case: pϕ^ 1Conpϕqq $ Conpϕq
Successor case: pϕ^ 1Conpϕqq $ @β ă αpConβpϕq Ñ Conβ`1pϕqq
Limit case: pϕ^ 1Conpϕqq $ @λ
´
limpλq Ñ
`
p@β ă λConβpϕqq Ñ Conλpϕq
˘¯
The base case and the limit case are both trivial. For the successor case we
first note that by the definition of 1Conpϕq,
1Conpϕq $ @xpTrueΠ0
1
pxq Ñ Conpϕ^ TrueΠ0
1
pxqqq,
and so by substituting Conβpϕq in for x,
(‘) 1Conpϕq $ TrueΠ0
1
pConβpϕqq Ñ Conpϕ^ TrueΠ0
1
pConβpϕqqq.
Thus, we reason as follows.
1Conpϕq $ Conβpϕq Ñ Conpϕ^ TrueΠ0
1
pConβpϕqqq by (‘).
Ñ Conpϕ^ Conβpϕqq.
Ñ Conβ`1pϕq by the definition of Conβ`1.
It is clear that the implication ϕ ^ 1Conpϕq $ ϕ ^ Conαpϕq is strict as long as
rϕ^ Conαpϕqs ‰ rKs. This completes the proof of the proposition. ❑
18 ANTONIO MONTALBÁN AND JAMES WALSH
In light of the previous proposition, one might conjecture that 1Con is the weakest
monotonic function majorizing every function of the form Conα for some recursive
well-ordering α on true sentences. However, this is not so. To demonstrate this,
we use a recursive linear order that has no hyperarithmetic infinite descending
sequences. Harrison [9] introduced such an ordering with order-type ωCK1 ˆp1`Qq;
see also Feferman and Spector [7] who consider such orderings in the context of
iterated reflection principles. We use a variantH of Harrison’s ordering such that it
is elementarily calculable whether an element of H is zero or a successor or a limit.
We note that since H has no hyperarithmetic descending sequences, transfinite
induction along H for Π01 properties is valid. Our idea is to produce a function
stronger than each Conα but weaker than 1Con by iterating Con along the Harrison
linear order.
Theorem 6.2. There are infinitely many monotonic functions f such that for
every recursive ordinal α, there is an elementary presentation a of α such that f
majorizes Cona on a true ideal but also 1Con majorizes f on a true ideal.
Proof. In Definition 3.2, we used Gödel’s fixed point lemma to produce iterates of
Con along an elementary well-ordering. We similarly use Gödel’s fixed point lemma
to define sentences Con‹pϕ, βq for β P H as follows.
EA $ Con‹pϕ, βq Ø @γ ăH β,Conpϕ^Con
‹pϕ, γqq.
We use the notation Conβpϕq for Con‹pϕ, βq. Recall that we are assuming that it
is elementarily calculable whether an element of H is zero or a successor or a limit.
Thus, the following clauses are provable in EA.
‚ Con0pϕq Ø J
‚ Conγ`1pϕq Ø Conpϕ^ Conγpϕqq
‚ Conλpϕq Ø @γ ăH λ,Con
γpϕq for λ a limit.
Claim. For γ P H, the function ϕ ÞÑ Conγpϕq is monotonic.
This follows immediately from Proposition 3.5. Note that in the statement of
Lemma 3.4 we assume only that ă is an elementary linear ordering, not a well-
ordering.
Claim. There are infinitely many monotonic functions f such that for every re-
cursive well-ordering α, there is an elementary presentation a of α such that f
majorizes Cona on true sentences.
If x ăH y then Con
ypϕq strictly implies Conxpϕq for every ϕ such that Conxpϕq ‰
rKs. Given the order type of H, this means that for infinitely many γ, for every
recursive well-ordering α, Conγ majorizes Cona where a represents α in H.
Claim. 1Con majorizes Cona on true sentences for each a P H.
Since every Π01 definable subset of ω has an H-least element, the sentence TI
H
Π0
1
,
which expresses the validity of transfinite induction along H for Π01 predicates, is
true. But then if ϕ $ TIHΠ0
1
, then for any γ P H, pϕ ^ 1Conpϕqq strictly implies
pϕ^ Conγpϕqq as long as rpϕ^ Conγpϕqqs ‰ rKs, as in Proposition 6.1. ❑
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7. An unbounded recursively enumerable set that contains no true
ideals
In this section we prove a limitative result. Theorem 2.2 demonstrates that if
f is monotonic and that for all consistent ϕ, (i) ϕ ^ Conpϕq implies fpϕq and (ii)
fpϕq strictly implies ϕ, then for cofinally many true ϕ, rfpϕqs “ rϕ ^ Conpϕqs.
It is natural to conjecture that cofinal equivalence with Con be strengthened to
equivalence to Con in the limit, i.e., on a true ideal. One strategy to strengthen
Theorem 2.2 in this way would be to show that every recursively enumerable set
that contains arbitrarily strong true sentences and that is closed under provable
equivalence contains a true ideal.
We now show that the aforementioned strategy fails. To this end, we define a
recursively enumerable set A that contains arbitrarily strong true sentences and
that is closed under provable equivalence but does not contain any true ideals. We
are grateful to Matthew Harrison-Trainor for simplifying the proof of the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.1. There is a recursively enumerable set A that contains arbitrarily
strong true sentences and that is closed under EA provable equivalence but does not
contain any true ideals.
Proof. Let tϕ0, ϕ1, ...u be an effective Gödel numbering of the language of arith-
metic. We describe the construction of A in stages. During a stage n we may
activate a sentence ψ, in which case we say that ψ is active until it is deactivated
at some later stage n` k. After describing the construction of A we verify that A
has the desired properties.
Stage 0: Numerate ϕ0 and  ϕ0 into A. Activate the sentences pϕ0 ^ Conpϕ0qq
and p ϕ0 ^ Conp ϕ0qq.
Stage n+1: There are finitely many active sentences. For each such sentence ψ,
numerate θ0 :“ pψ^ϕn`1q and θ1 :“ pψ^ ϕn`1q into A. Deactivate the sentence
ψ and activate the sentences pθ0 ^ Conpθ0qq and pθ1 ^ Conpθ1qq.
We dovetail the construction with a search through EA proofs. If we ever see
that EA $ ϕ Ø ψ for some ϕ that we have already numerated into A, then we
numerate ψ into A.
Now we check that A has the desired properties. It is clear that A is recursively
enumerable and that A is closed under EA provable equivalence.
Claim. A contains arbitrarily strong true sentences. That is, for each true sentence
ϕ, there is a true sentence ψ such that ψ $ ϕ and ψ P A.
At any stage in the construction of A, there are finitely many active sentences,
ψ0, ..., ψk. An easy induction shows that exactly one of ψ0, ..., ψk is true. Indeed,
exactly one of ϕ0 or  ϕ0 is true, and hence so is exactly one of ϕ0 ^ Conpϕ0q and
 ϕ0 ^ Conp ϕ0q. And if θ is true, then so is exactly one of ζ0 :“ θ ^ ϕk and
ζ1 :“ θ ^ ϕk, and hence so too is exactly one of ζ0 ^ Conpζ0q and ζ1 ^ Conpζ1q.
Let ϕk be a true sentence. At stage k in the construction of A there are only
finitely many active sentences ψ0, ..., ψn. We have already seen that exactly one of
ψi is true. But then ϕk ^ ψi is true, pϕk ^ ψi $ ϕkq, and pϕk ^ ψiq is numerated
into A.
Claim. A contains no true ideals.
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An easy induction shows that if ψ0 and ψ1 are both active at the same stage,
then for any θ, if θ implies both ψ0 and ψ1 then θ P rKs.
Let ϕ be a true sentence in A. By the previous remark, the only sentences in A
that strictly imply ϕ are (i) EA refutable sentences and (ii) sentences that imply
ϕ^Conpϕq. Since the Lindenbaum algebra of EA is dense, this means there is some
ψ such that pϕ ^ Conpϕqq strictly implies ψ strictly implies ϕ but ψ R A. ❑
The following questions remain.
Question 7.2. Is the relation of cofinal agreement on true sentences an equivalence
relation on recursive monotonic operators?
Question 7.3. Let f be monotonic. Suppose that for all consistent ϕ,
(i) ϕ^ Conpϕq implies fpϕq and
(ii) fpϕq implies ϕ.
Must f be equivalent to the identity or to Con on a true ideal?
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